![]() ![]() Failed-trade privacy: No MEV bundle received by the miner is ever disclosed to any third party after it has not been selected for a block.īad behavior includes, but is not limited to, sending bundle information to third parties, and storing bundle information to persistent storage past their intended use.īlock producers disclose if they are connected to the Flashbots network.īlock producers disclose the coinbase address they are using.īlock producers disclose how their MEV revenues are distributed to their stakeholders.īlock producers report the amount of hashrate they point to their Flashbots node.īlock producers report the amount of revenue they received from the Flashbots network.īlock producers are diligent in swiftly and correctly implementing the latest versions of Flashbots core and Ethereum without unjustified delay.īlock producers properly secure their node infrastructure to protect the integrity of their system. Pre-trade privacy: No MEV bundle received by the miner is ever disclosed to any third party before the bundle is included in a block. In the future, we may additionally require participants in the Flashbots network to defend against such attacks actively, ensuring the long-term health of any networks supported by Flashbots and therefore the MEV ecosystem.īlock producers are expected to protect the confidentiality of the MEV bundles they receive from the Flashbots relay.Ĭonfidentiality includes both pre-trade privacy and failed-trade privacy: This means minimizing the uncle rate and re-organization rate in an effort to provide finality as quickly as possible.īad behavior includes, but is not limited to, re-ordering chain history in an attempt to extract MEV in what is called a "time-bandit attack", and prioritizing transmission of sealed blocks to subsets of the network in what is called "selfish mining". Sensitive information excludes MEV bundles correctly included in a block and distributed over the public network with the intention of such block being included as a canonical block or as an uncle block.īad behavior includes, but is not limited to, operating a trading bot which benefits from knowing the winning bid value of the bundle auction, operating a trading bot which steals or frontruns strategies from bundles, operating a bundle selection algorithm which prioritizes some searchers over others.īlock producers are expected to contribute to the consensus stability of Ethereum. Sensitive information includes the state of the MEV bundle queue, sealed bid, pending block, bundle simulation, bundle content, or bundle merging. This includes, but is not limited to, implementation errors, intended omissions, and new "features" which change how the system operates.īlock producers are expected never to act or enable third parties to act on sensitive information received through the Flashbots relay. Block producers are expected to follow the Flashbots core upgrade process and swiftly upgrade their nodes to meet latest requirements.īad behavior includes any deviation from the specified node behavior. The Flashbots core devs aim to provide technical support to block producers on a best effort basis to help resolve any technical issues.īlock producers are expected to operate an Ethereum node which complies with the latest version of the Ethereum specification and the latest version of the Flashbots core specification. ![]() In the event of a breach of these principles by one of the block producers, the Flashbots core devs may act on behalf of stakeholders in disabling the access to the Flashbots network until the breach is rectified. Block producers participating in the Flashbots Alpha are expected to collaborate in the development of an ecosystem for MEV extraction which reinforces the security and stability of the Ethereum network. Namely, the Flashbots network aims to uphold the properties of fairness, efficiency, transparency, and permissionlessness. Flashbots aims to eliminate these trust requirements in ().īlock producers connected to the Flashbots Alpha are expected to act in the () of the Flashbots network, the Ethereum network, and its various stakeholders. ![]() This document aims to define a set of key principles and best practices upon which stakeholders of the Flashbots network can hold block producers (miners in ETH 1.0) accountable for their continued participation in the Flashbots Alpha.įair Market Principles for MEV is required in the Flashbots Alpha due to the technical limitations in the early stage of the project which are mitigated on the basis of trust. # Flashbots Fair Market Principles (FFMP) ![]()
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